Bluetooth standard has a provision for mutual authentication of connecting devices but not their actual users and allows access control during connection setup only. In this paper, we propose a User Authorization and Pairing (UAP) application, that has the ability to perform authentication and authorization of users using role based model. Pairing procedure, which exchanges link key between devices, is also performed as a part of the user authorization process. Integrity of the message are guaranteed by using message authentication codes. We also extend an attack on a short PIN during pairing procedure for devices compliant with the Bluetooth specification version 1.1.
INTRODUCTION
Convergence of computing and communications has been promised for many years. One of the most important component technologies is wireless communications which enables the computing devices, such as notebook computers, personal digital assistants (PDA), "smart" phones, two-way pagers, digital camens, etc., to communicate or synchronize with each other wirelessly. An important technology towards Personal Area Network (PAN) is Bluetooth. Bluetooth protocol enables devices to communicate from a short distance without wires and has recently been proposed as the standard for short distance wireless communications of mobile devices [Z].
In addition to being a cable replacement, Bluetooth also provides some other features, such as wireless ad-hoc connection between two mobile devices and access point to the Internet connection [2] . To ensure usage protection and data contidentiality, Bluetooth has to provide security measures both at the application layer and the link layer (31, which are appropriate for peer environments.
Bluetooth provides device authentication, encryption and device authorization. Bluetooth security has been studied by several authors, for example [7, 16, 171 . It is r e a l i d that Bluetooth security has several security drawbacks. The first important thing is the way its authentication works. Authentication mechanism in Bluetooth is used to authenticate a device and not the user 1161. The local device cannot determine who is using the remote device. It means that if someone steals a PDA which has been authenticated with a laptop earlier, then he can use this PDA to access services in the laptop, for example uansfemng or deleting files. Secondly, Bluetooth does not define authorization separately for each service [16] . If authorization is to be applied in the Bluetooth architecture, changes in the security manager and the registration processes would be necessary.
These two drawbacks have been imposed as open prohlems in [16]. In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem hy proposing a secure authentication protocol and implementing a role based access control for granting authorization.
The final problem is concerning the data integrity. Bluetooth implicitly provides data integrity via encryption or CRC check sum. However, it is known that encryption does not guarantee data integrity [IO] . It is also known that CRC only protects data on noisy channels and it cannot be applied to a channel which is COntrOlled by the adversaries [IO]. It implies that data integrity is not guaranteed in Bluetooth.
In our proposed protocol implementation, we solve these problems in a User Authorization and Pairing (UN) Application. The application can authenticate and authorize users, who use a remote device and wish to access to services at the local device. Pairing is performed as part of User Authorization procedure, which is more secure hecause human interaction is not the main component in this procedure. Moreover, it allows a combination of message authentication and encryption to protect the communication.
We also note that there is a problem concerning the "pairing" mechanism. To perform a pairing, each user has to enter the PIN code twice on the unpaired devices, which is impractical. [7] . The attack is applicable to Bluetooth Specification version 1.0. In this paper, we also present an extension of this atlack so that it is compliant with Bluetooth Specification version 1.1. As our UAP generates sufficiently long and random common PIN, it resists against this attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the Bluetooth Security described in [31. In section 3, we present the extension of the attack of [71 which is applicable to Bluetooth Specification version 1.1. Section 4 presents some solutions to the Bluetooth Security problems stated in [16]. In section 5, we present our implementation of User Authorization and Pairing (UAP) Application, which has the ability to ensure data integrity in Bluetooth message communication. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Notatinns
The ring of integers modulo a number M. is denoted by Z, , and its multiplicative group, which contains only the integers relatively prime to n, by Z;.
BLUETOOTH SECURITY
There are four different entities that are used to maintain security at the link layer: a 48 bits public address, BD ADDR, which is unique for each device, two private user keys: 128 bits for authentication and 8 to 128 bits for ennyptiou, and a 128 bit random number (RAND) which is different for each new transaction. The authentication key is used to generate the encryption key, each time encryption is activated and a new encryption key is requested. Therefore, the authentication key is more static in its nature compared to the ennyption key. To underline the importance of the authentication key to a specific Bluetooth link, it is referred to as the link The link keys are either semi-permanent or temporary [3]. A semi-permanent key is stored in non-volatile memory, that can he used after the current session terminates. A temporary limk key is only available during the current session, and it cannot be reused after the session terminates. We omit the details of the link keys because it is irrelevant to our discussion and refer the reader to [3] for more details.
The next important thing to Bluetooth security is a PIN code. A PIN code is a number which can be fixed or selected by the user. The length of a PIN code is between 1 to 16 octets. The PIN must be entered to both devices during the pairing process [17].
Device Authentication
The device authentication in Bluetooth uses a challengeresponse scheme, in which a claimant's knowledge of a secret key is verified through a 2-move protocol [3]. The verification involves the claimant's Bluetooth address (denoted by BD-ilDDRc), a random input, which is the challenge, denoted by A U R A I V D~, together with a link key, L X , and an authentication code, denoted by E I . The result of the computation is SRES, which is then sent to the verifier device to be compared with its own calculated SRES using its own inputs. The result of the verification implies that a correct claimantlverifier pair share the same secret key LK.
More precise interaction is illustrated as follows.
B D A U U R c , A U R A N D s )
In the above interaction, V denotes the verifier and C denotes the claimant. The outputs of this function are SRES which is used in the verification procedure described above and ACO which is used for encryption procedure.
Encryption
The Bluetooth specification describes the link encryption algorithm as a stream cipher, which uses Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs When two devices do not have a common link key, an initialization key must be created based on a PIN and a random number. Then, an authentication needs to be done. The calculation of the authentication response is based on the initialization key. After a successful authentication, the link is created.
As pointed out in [71, by eavesdropping the pairing procedure between two victim devices, for instance BT1 and BT2, an attacker can derive the link key if the PIN entered is not sufficiently long. In this section, we will extend the attack so that it works with Bluetooth Specification version 1.1.
According to Bluetooth Specification version 1 .l, the pairing procedure between BT1 and ET2 is done as follows.
BT1:
PIN is entered and initialization key is generated.
ET1 + BT,:
A random number to generate initialization key, Kinit.
DT2:
PIN is entered and initialization key Kinit is generated.
4.
ETz + ETl : Indication to accept the pairing. Hijacking attack can be done by an adversary who eavesdrops the mffic. The adversary will first guess all PINs up to a certain length (which must not be too large). From each guessed PIN, he calculates the initialization key, then the random numbers in 5 and 6, then the combination key and then computes the response to the challenge. He. verifies the correctness of his guess by comparing his generated response and the transmitted response in IO. After reaching the correct PIN, he has the correct link key. Having the link key, he can eavesdrop transmissions between the two devices or impersonate one device to communicate with the other.
ETl
A similar attack can be performed, when the adversary initiates communication with the victim device. The adversary sends a random number to generate the initialization key Kinit. Next, the adversary sends a random challenge to authenticate the victim device (similar message sequence as in the procedure above with BT1 acting as the adversary). After receiving response from the victim device, the attacker will test all PINs up to a certain length by the response. An example situation where the attack can be applied is when the victim device has a fixed PIN. The adversary wants to access the device, but he does not know the correct PIN.
AUTHORIZATION AND ACCESS CONTROL IN BLUETOOTH
As mentioned earlier, Bluetooth specification does not authenticate the user, but the device itself. It is more desirable to have an authentication which will identify whether the user is authorized to access the device rather than only authenticate the device itself. In this section, we propose a user authentication mechanism that can be used on top of the Bluetooth device authentication.
The second problem is how to have an access control in Bluetooth? Consider a situation where a Bluetooth enabled laptop, which can provide FTP, LAN access and Serial Emulation, is connected with several devices owned by different people. So far, there is no easy way to allow a subset of these services to be accessed by different people with Bluetooth enabled devices. Once a Bluetooth enabled device is connected to the laptop, the Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) can be launched to search the available services, and all of them will be presented to the user. It would be desirable to have a role based mechanism that can identify whether a user is allowed to access a particular service provided, and allow to v a q the access privileges for different user.
User Authentication
We use a password-based mutual authentication and key agreement protocol. The local device can authenticate the remote user and vice versa using this mechanism. The au- In the following, we briefly review the description of S W . The protocol works in Z;, where n is a large safe prime number. Let g denotes a primitive root modulo n. All of the computations in this protocol are performed modulo n. The server S stores the clients' public key U in its database (where U = g" and z is the client's secret key, which is obtained from z = H ( s , P ) , where s is a random suing used as the user's salt and P is the user's password and H denotes a one-way hash function) together with a salr s, which is a random string. Suppose a client C wants to authenticate to a server S, then the following protocol will be performed.
1.
Firstly, S looks up (.7, U) and sends s to C.
2. C computes x = H ( s , P) and A = 9". where a is an
Ephemeral private key and it is generated randomly, and sends A to S.
3. S computes l l = U + ga, where b is an Ephemeral private key and it is generated randomly, and generate another random number U.
4. S sends (B, U ) to C.
C computes S = ( E -a")"+"" and K = H ( S )
6. S computes S = ( A u " )~ and K = H ( S ) , 7 . C computes M i = H(A, B, K) and sends it to S. At the end of the protocol, S and C share the session key K.
S verifies whether hft A H ( A , E ,

Access Control
The purpose of having an access control is to grant or deny a particular service to a Bluetooth enabled user after the user authenticates himself to the other device. At the moment, Bluetooth only allows access control at connection set-up [I61 and it is not granted on a role-based. In this section, we
propose two solutions to this problem. For our purpose, we define three basic element sets in an RBAC model, namely U is a set of legitimate users, 0 is a set of roles assigned to each user Ui E U and S is a set of services available. In Bluetooth enabled device, which provides some services Si E S, i = 1,2, . . . , n, there are two RBAC tables which will be used to either granddeny a request by an authenticated user U i in the system. An example of RBAC tahle is shown in Table 2 . 
USER AND PAIRJNG AUTHORIZATION (UAP)
APPLICATION
The goal of our UAP application is to provide the following capabilities.
Secure User Authentication and Authorization.
Secure Pairing as part of the UAP procedure.
Message Authentication to provide Data Integrity. 
User Authentication
When a user uses a Client Device to log-in to a Server Device, a mutual authentication procedure will be performed.
As mentioned in the previous section, we use SRF for this purpose. We assume that the Server Device protect the password verifier securely. The user proves his identity by showing his knowledge of the password. The Server Device proves its identity to the user by showing its knowledge of the password verifier (obtained in the initialization phase, when the user is registered to the server device). UAP Server maintains the following information in its database for user authentication:
Authentication data: including user names, salts, verifiers, modulus and generators for SRP.
Authenticated users: list of the previous authenticated users. It has two fields: user name and remote device Bluetooth address.
Access Control UAP uses RBAC as described in the previous section. Each service S, has an associated role in 0. A user assigned to this role can access the service provided for this role.
Message Authentication
We use the 20-byte MAC incorporated in each message on RFCOMM to provide message authentication. For this p upose, each message is appended by a 20-byte Most Significant Bit (MSB) of the encrypted message using the session key K derived during the authentication process using SRF.
On the receiverlverifier side, the message is encrypted again using the same session key and it is verified whether the 20-byte MAC matches with the calculated MAC to guarantee the data integrity in the message.
CONCLUSIONS
We extended the short PIN attack during the pairing procedure from 171 so that it can he successful for devices compliant withthe Bluetooth specification version 1.1. We demonstrated ON design and implementation of User Authorization and Pairing (UAP) application, which provides secure authorization, access control of services based on identify of the user as well as data integrity checker using MAC to protect the communication.
